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This paper deals with the effect of constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in 
a panel of observations for more than 70 developing and developed countries in the 1955-
2005 period. Testable hypotheses are drawn from recent developments in the comparative 
politics literature that see political institutions as key elements in shaping public policies. 
Using differences-in-differences regressions we find a positive effect of a transition into 
democracy on agricultural protection. However, this average effect masks substantial 
heterogeneities across different forms of democracy. Indeed, what matters are transitions 
to proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) democracies, as well as to permanent (as 
opposed to temporary) democracies. Moreover, while we do not detect significant 
differences across alternative forms of government (presidential versus parliamentary 
systems), there is some evidence that the effect of proportional election is exacerbated 
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Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes 
 
Alessandro Olper and Valentina Raimondi 
 
 
The literature concerning political and economic determinants of agricultural protection tends 
to ignore the role that constitutional rules play in shaping agricultural policies. In contrast, the 
newly emerging field of comparative political economics places growing emphasis on the 
effect of political institutions on public policy outcomes. The inclusion of political 
institutions – such as electoral rules and forms of government – in formal political economy 
models has produced several testable hypotheses firmly motivated by theory. One of the most 
influential lines of research in this area is by Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003), who look at 
how constitutional rules shape policy outcomes. Other recent contributions along the same 
research line are those by Grossman and Helpman (2005), who studied the effect of ‘party 
discipline’ on trade policy, and by Persson (2005), Persson and Tabellini (2006, 2008), 
Besley and Persson (2008) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2008) who, among others, 
look at the economic and political effects of different forms of democracy and the origins of 
‘State Capacity’. 
Evidence that links political institutions to agricultural policy outcomes (e.g. Beghin 
and Kherallah 1994, Swinnen, Banerjee and de Gorter 2001, Henning, Krause and Struve 
2002, Olper 2001, Thiesse and Porsche 2007) provides a weak link with this ‘new generation’ 
of political economy models, lessening our understanding of the mechanism in place and, 
consequently, its policy implications. Some contributions have tried to go further, closing the 
gap between theory and evidence (see Henning 2004, Olper and Raimondi 2004). However, 
questions still remain regarding the robustness and generalization of existing empirical 
findings. First, the low within-country variation in political institutions forces the researcher 
to look especially at the cross-country variation in the data, rendering the robustness of the 
inferences questionable. Second, actual evidence often refers to a broad definition of 
institutions, such as proxies for the degree of democracy or composite indices for institutions 
quality. Third, Glaeser et al. (2004) claim that it is hard to find rules-based measures of 
institutions systematically correlated with structural policies. To address this last point, 2 
 
 
conceptual studies and more recent empirical evidence stress that democratic details matter 
(see Persson 2005, Acemoglu 2005).  
Starting from these considerations, the objective of this chapter is to find robust 
empirical regularity that maps constitutional rules into agricultural policy outcomes. The 
analysis takes advantage of the database on agricultural policy distortions developed by the 
World Bank (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008), covering a sample of more than 70 countries 
in the period 1955-2005. By exploiting the panel dimensions of the dataset we investigate the 
effect of regime changes – autocracy vs. democracy – on agricultural price distortions, as 
well as whether details of these forms of democracy, such as the nature of electoral rules and 
government types, systematically affect the extent of agricultural distortions.  
From a methodological point of view, we follow the recent tendency of including 
democracies as well as non-democracies in the sample, to overcome the fact that established 
democracies do not display sufficient (time) variation in their constitutional features. This 
gives us the possibility of using a more robust empirical approach that can exploit the within-
country variation in the data (see Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008, Giavazzi and Tabellini 
2005).  
The main results can be summarized as follows. First, we find a robust positive effect 
of transition into democracy on the level of agricultural protection: a shift from autocracy to 
democracy induces an increase in agricultural protection (or a reduction in taxation) of about 
3-4 percent points. Secondly, this average effect masks substantial heterogeneities across 
different forms of democracy. Indeed, what matters are transitions to proportional (as 
opposed to majoritarian) democracies, as well as to permanent (as opposed to temporary) 
democracies. Moreover, while we do not detect significant differences across alternative 
forms of government (presidential versus parliamentary), there is evidence that the effect of 
proportional systems is exacerbated under parliamentary regimes, but dampened under 








                                                 
The first attempt to systematically study the effect of political institutions on agricultural 
protection in a broad context is that of Beghin and Kherallah (1994).
1 They look at how 
different political systems (no-party, one-party, dominant party and multiparty systems) and 
civil liberties (Gastil index) affect the protection structure in 25 developing and developed 
countries. The results show that political institutions matter, and that their effect is non-
monotonic: protection peaks with dominant party systems, and then becomes non-increasing 
despite further democratization.  
A non-monotonic relationship between democracy and protection in a larger cross 
section of countries can also be found in Swinnen et al. (2000). Using the Gastil index of 
political rights, they found that moving from low to medium political rights reduces 
protection, but that any further increase in democratization does not necessarily result in 
substantial effects on agricultural protection. Clearly, this non-linear behavior goes in the 
opposite direction to the previous one. Indeed, Beghin and Kherallah (1994) find an inverted 
U-shaped relation between democracy and agricultural protection, whereas Swinnen et al. 
(2000) find a U-shaped relation.  
Motivated by this early evidence, and by the growing literature linking institutions to 
economic growth and development (e.g. North 1990, Hall and Jones 1999, Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson 2001), Olper (2001) uses alternative indices of democracy and 
composite indices measuring the quality of institutions that protect and enforce property 
rights.
2 The objective was to identify, and separate, the potential effects of these ‘different’ 
institutional dimensions since, as suggested by several authors, focusing only on the level of 
democracy might be too simple to explain differences in performance and governance. The 
results strongly support this last prediction: democracy displays a positive linear effect on 
protection, but it is not the level of democracy per se that seems to matter. Rather, that study 
shows that the quality of institutions matters: protection increases with institution quality at 
low levels of this dimension, but the relationship turns negative once a moderate amount of 
institutional quality has been achieved.  
The previous evidence relies largely on cross-section variation in the data. To date, 
the only study that uses a long time-series is that of Swinnen, Banerjee and de Gorter (2001), 
 
1 Important precursors of this kind of analyses can be found in the works of Bates (1983, 1989) on agrarian 
development in African countries. Moreover, the relationship between democracy and agricultural protection 
was first highlighted by Lindert (1991), who in a cross-country analysis found a positive relationship when 
democracy was associated with rapid agricultural decline. 
2 These composite indices come from two private international investment risk services: International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) and Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI), and was first introduced in the 
growth literature by Knack and Keefer (1995).  4 
 
 
                                                 
who looks at the agricultural protection patterns in Belgium between 1877 and 1990. This 
paper, exploiting the within-country variation in protection, shows that only those political 
reforms that determine a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interests 
– e.g. the extension of voting rights to small farmers in the early 20th century – induce an 
increase in agricultural protection. This result is important, first because it gives a logical 
interpretation to the democracy-protection non-linearity discussed above, and secondly 
because it highlights the importance of drawing inferences from regime changes to more 
carefully capture the effect of democratization on protection (Swinnen 2010). 
A major limitation of this first thread of evidence lies in its weak link with 
comparative political economy models. First attempts to link theory and evidence more 
closely were made by Henning Krause and Struve (2002)
3 and Olper and Raimondi (2004). 
The former authors focus on the specific organization of legislative decision-making, 
building on the political exchange model of Weingast and Marshall (1988) and on political 
science literature (Lijphart 1990). They show that agrarian interests are better represented in 
bicameralism systems, due to the bias of the second chamber towards rural districts, and in 
the proportional electoral systems, due to the bias of this system towards particular interest in 
organized minorities. Cross-country evidence on ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
supports these predictions.  
In a similar vein, Olper and Raimondi (2004) test the prediction from recent political 
economy models that show how different electoral rules and forms of government 
systematically affect the level and composition of government spending (see also Persson and 
Tabellini 2000). In a sample of 29 OECD countries they show that, on average, presidential 
systems and majoritarian electoral rules are associated with smaller protection for the dairy 
industry (about 6-7 percent) than are parliamentary and proportional systems. However, this 
under-protectionist bias of presidential-majoritarian systems tends to reverse in countries 
where there is a strong geographical concentration of dairy farming, suggesting that the 
relationship between electoral rules, forms of government and agricultural protection could 
be non-monotonic. 
A non-linear relationship between agricultural protection and electoral rules in a 
cross-section of countries was also found recently by Henning (2008). Specifically, building 
on the probabilistic-voting model of Henning and Struve (2007), the author tests the 
prediction that in developed countries the relationship between agricultural protection and 
 
3 See also Henning (2004), where a similar model is used to explain the different levels of protection between 
the EU and US.  5 
 
 
                                                 
district magnitude would be an inverted U-shape. In other words, agricultural protection first 
increases and then decreases with district size. Developing countries, however, would have 
the same relationship reversed, or U-shaped. Empirical evidence from cross-country analysis 
supports this relationship, especially in developed countries.  
Finally, Thies and Porche (2007) ‘extended’ the previous evidence using a more 
heuristic approach and a larger set of political institution variables, including proxies for veto 
players, federalism, party structure and also year of elections. Their econometric results find 
several of these political dimensions quite robust across different specifications, and in line 
with expectations.
4 For example, the authors show that having a federal system and higher 
party fragmentation increases protection. Interestingly, they also show a positive and 
significant effect of the electoral variable on protection. That result is consistent with the 
political business cycle literature (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997).
5 
Overall, the empirical evidence summarized above is supportive of the important role 
political institutions play in shaping agricultural policy. At the same time, however, several 
shortcomings suggest that many aspects of the interaction between political institutions and 
agricultural protection remain unclear.  
One concern is that, apart from some notable exceptions, the actual evidence is largely 
derived from a heuristic approach, where the link between political institutions and policy 
outcomes is not carefully derived from theory, thus reducing our understanding of the 
mechanism in place and, consequently, their policy implications. Secondly, several studies 
focus especially on the (cross-country) effect of democracy, adding further compliance to the 
analysis. This is because the definition of the degree of democracy is obviously a complex 
issues; furthermore, actual theory offers clear predictions, especially concerning the effects of 
the forms of democracy rather than the effect of democracy per se. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, several questions still remain with regard to both the identification of the causal 
effect of institutions on agricultural policies, and the robustness of the empirical evidence. 
Indeed, given the low variation in political institutions, especially in developed countries, and 
the short time period involved by the majority of studies, actual inferences are drawn 
 
4 The authors also conclude that political variables are more robust explanatory variables than traditional 
structural-economic ones. However, a potential shortcoming of this result is that the specifications do not 
include, simultaneously, structural variables, such as agricultural labor or value added share, with the level of 
development, understandably omitted in the Thies and Porche’s specifications.  
5 Other relevant institutional dimensions investigated by Olper (2007), are government ideology (left-wing 
versus right-wing) and land inequality. However, given our focus on constitutional rules, we do not further 
discuss this line of research. The relationship between ideology, inequality and trade policy is developed by Dutt 




especially from cross-country variation in the data, limiting the ability of the researcher to 
control for unobserved characteristics that affect both political institutions and policy 
outcomes, such as history and culture.  
 
 
Conceptual framework and testable hypotheses 
 
 
Before presenting our hypotheses, we first examine further the relationship between 
democratization and agricultural protection and then the role of different forms of democracy. 
 
Democratization and agricultural protection 
 
One of the most fundamental features of political institutions is related to whether a country 
is a democracy or not, simply because this status is highly related to the credibility of 
constitutions (Acemoglu 2005). Thus, the first question that arises is whether democracies 
have agricultural policies different from autocracies, ceteris paribus. Theoretically this 
relationship is complex, and obviously linked to the more general effect of democracy on 
public policy.  
As stressed by de Haan and Sturm (2003) economic theory does not give a clear 
answer to this question. Several authors point out that arguments exist for both a positive and 
a negative relationship (Przeworsky 1991, Banerji and Ghanem 1997). Others suggest that 
economic policies are, in a first approximation, the outcome of tradeoffs related to efficiency 
or to conflict among generations or among industries, and thus are not specific to particular 
institutions (Mulligan, Gill and Sala-i-Martin 2004).  
According to Przeworsky (1991), one of the main differences between democratic and 
authoritarian regimes lies in the level, within the political process, of free participation by 
independent organizations. Authoritarian regimes abhor independent organizations, and either 
incorporate them into centralized control or repress them by force. Starting from this 
consideration, we have two contrasting views about whether agricultural protection is more 
or less likely to occur under democratic or authoritarian regimes.  
One view is that the voices of farmers may be better heard in an electoral democracy 
(Lindert 1991) where the interest groups are free to compete for political rents. By contrast, 
authoritarian regimes, which are better able to discourage rent-seeking activities, tax or do 7 
 
 
                                                 
not support their agricultural sectors. These arguments suggest that with democratization 
agricultural protection could be increasing, a view that fits the more general notion that 
democratization also induces redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2008).
6  
Contrasting the above-mentioned view is the probability of governments adopting 
inefficient policies to benefit specific interest groups or ‘insiders’, a probability that is 
actually higher under authoritarian regimes. In a well-functioning democracy, outsiders vote 
and impose some limits on what narrower interest groups can achieve, while in a less 
democratic environment the government needs to worry only about groups that have real 
power (Banerji and Ghanem 1997). Thus it could be suggested that agricultural policy 
transfers are fewer in democracies, but this argument is also consistent with a non-linear or 
non-monotonic relationship.  
A correlated argument stressed by de Haan and Sturm (2003) suggests that, at the 
beginning of liberalization, an authoritarian regime could be necessary, as the mass of voters 
often turn down economic reforms despite the fact that voters can see long-term benefits. 
Indeed, several policies popular in the long-run are often not implemented in democratic 
regimes.  
From this brief discussion it emerges that, conceptually, the net effect of democracy 
on agricultural protection appears, at best, of uncertain sign and inconclusive. Thus, to gain 
some insight from existing literature, we now focus attention on actual evidence linking 
democracy to public policies and economic development. 
In a large sample of developing countries from 1970 to 1999, Milner and Kubota 
(2005) show that regime change towards democracy is associated with trade liberalization. 
Since an important component of agricultural distortions in developing countries is indirect 
and related to import-substituting industrialization policies (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008), 
this evidence suggests that transitions from autocracy to democracy could be positively 
related to agricultural protection.  
More general evidence on the relationship between regime change and economic 
(trade) liberalization can be found in Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Persson (2005). The 
former, using difference-in-differences estimation, shows that a transition to democracy 
induces a more liberal trade policy. The latter, using a similar estimation strategy, goes a step 
further and shows that what matters is not the simple dichotomy between democracy and 
 
6 Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) document how the extension of voting rights in several Western societies in 
the nineteenth century led to unprecedented redistributive programs. They also argue that these political reforms 
can be viewed as a strategic decision by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. 
The last argument is formally developed in Acemoglu and Robinson (2008). 8 
 
 
                                                 
autocracy but the form of democracy. Specifically, Persson shows that the adoption of 
structural policies that promote long-term economic performance is more frequent in 
parliamentary-proportional democracies than in presidential-majoritarian ones. Such evidence 
is important because, by exploiting the within-country variation in the data, it leads to more 
robust results than cross-country evidence, overcoming the criticism of fragility advanced by 
several authors (e.g. Glaeser et al. 2004, Acemoglu 2005). 
Finally, also relevant to our discussion are recent papers that study the effect of 
democracy on economic growth and development. The most robust stylized fact about 
agricultural protection patterns is the strong positive correlation with economic development 
(Anderson 1995, Swinnen 1994). The arguments as to why democracy can foster growth are 
similar to the arguments as to why democracy affects economic liberalization (see de Haan 
and Sturm 2003).  
The relationship between democracy and economic performance, when studied in 
cross-section regressions, is ambiguous and inconclusive (Barro 1997, Glaeser et al. 2004). 
However, there is a growing literature exploiting the within-country variation in the data and 
difference-in-differences methodology (Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008, Rodrik and 
Wacziarg 2005, Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005, Persson 2005, Persson and Tabellini 2006). 
This literature, in combination with semi-parametric methods (Persson and Tabellini 2008), 
shows how the effect of democracy on growth tends to be positive and large in magnitude.
7 
Thus, once again, these results appear supportive of a positive relationship between transition 
to democracy and agricultural protection. However, they also suggest that this positive effect 
could be conditional to the characteristics of reforming and non-reforming countries, and to 
the specific form of democracy. 
 
Forms of democracy and agricultural protection 
 
From the previous discussion it emerges that, while theoretically inconclusive, the effect of 
democracy on agricultural protection may also be related to the characteristics of democratic 
institutions. Thus, in this section the focus is on two key aspects of any democratic 
institutions (Persson and Tabellini 2004): the electoral rules, and the forms of government.  
 
Electoral rules and economic policy 
 
7 On the positive effect of democracy and growth, see also the recent contribution of Aghion, Alesini and Trebbi  
(2008), which stresses how political rights induce positive growth, especially in more advanced sectors. 9 
 
 
                                                 
There is a growing literature that has formalized how electoral rules influence the level and 
composition of government spending (Lizzeri and Persico 2001, Persson and Tabellini 2000, 
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno 2002), as well as other public policies including trade 
policy (Hatfield and Hauk 2003, Roelfsema 2004, Grossman and Helpman 2005).  
A first prediction from these models is that proportional elections tend to address 
government spending towards large programs benefiting large groups in the population (such 
as welfare programs) while majoritarian elections give the politicians a greater incentive to 
target transfers to geographically smaller constituency groups.  
There are two main reasons at the root of these differences (Persson and Tabellini 
2000, ch. 8). In proportional elections the legislators are elected from large districts and this 
gives the politician a strong incentive to get support from large coalitions in the population. 
By contrast, in majoritarian elections the districts are small, creating a strong incentive for 
politicians to target policies towards key district constituencies. Furthermore, the electoral 
formula has a reinforcing effect. In proportional election the voters choose a list of 
candidates, while in majoritarian elections a single candidate is chosen. Thus, in the former 
case the implemented policy is likely to reflect what is optimal for the party, often reflecting 
the national perspective and favouring broad forms of redistribution. The opposite applies in 
majoritarian systems, where the individual legislator tends to ‘look after’ the interests of the 
represented district, thus favouring a more narrow distribution. 
Several, but not all, models predict that the electoral rule also affects the level of 
government spending, with proportional elections normally associated with larger spending. 
Indeed, while Persson and Tabellini (1999) found greater overall government spending in 
majoritarian elections, both Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) and Kontopoulos 
and Perotti (1999) claim greater spending in proportional systems. The latter prediction was 
recently supported theoretically and empirically by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2008), 
who studied the effect of electoral rules on party and government structure in parliamentary 
democracies. They stress that proportional elections induce a greater incidence of coalition 
governments than do majoritarian elections, giving rise to a larger budget spending as 
minority interests are more represented in the legislature.
8 
A few recent papers have applied this kind of reasoning to trade policy, although the 
theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence appear mixed. For example, Roelfsema 
 
8 Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007) formalize the so-called common pool problem: if different groups have 
partial control over some component of government, then none of them fully internalizes the fiscal costs. This 
problem is clearly exacerbated under proportional elections because, as suggested by political science literature 
(see, e.g., Lijphart 1990), proportional elections make coalition governments more likely.  10 
 
 
                                                 
(2004) and Grossman and Helpman (2005) predict, ceteris paribus, higher average rates of 
protection in countries with majoritarian election, as an effect of the stiffer electoral 
competition in swing districts. Both Roelfsema (2004) and Persson (2005) find empirical 
support for the hypothesis that proportional democracies are associated with more open trade 
policies than majoritarian democracies. By contrast, both Rogowski and Kayser (2002) and 
Hatfield and Hauk (2003) obtain exactly the opposite result, namely that proportional systems 
have higher average tariffs than majoritarian systems. Wiberg (2006) tries to reconcile these 
apparent contradictions by incorporating an export industry producing for foreign markets. 
He argues and find empirical support for the idea that trade policy is more (less) restrictive 
under proportional systems if marginal districts are populated by relatively more (less) 
factory owners with interests in the exporting sector.  
 
Forms of government and economic policy  
Few formal models assess the effect of different forms of government on the level and 
composition of government spending. The classical distinction is between presidential versus 
parliamentary regimes. In the former, the appointment is direct, through citizen election, 
while in the latter it is indirect, through a vote of confidence from an elected parliament.  
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000) compare these two forms, focusing on 
different features such as the separation of power over legislation (agenda setting) and the 
degree of ‘legislative cohesion’. In parliamentary regimes the government has stronger 
powers to initiate legislation than in a presidential regime, and thus it is easier for politicians 
to collude with each other at the voters’ expense, resulting in higher taxes and spending. 
Moreover, in parliamentary systems the vote of confidence induces more discipline within 
the government coalition. Thus a stable majority tends to satisfy the broad interests of its 
constituents.  
These models give clear predictions of the level and composition of government 
spending, thereby mimicking and reinforcing the previous discussion on electoral systems. 
Specifically, for presidential regimes the prediction is for overall lower spending and taxation 
than for parliamentary regimes. Moreover, presidential regimes are also associated with 
target programs, whereas parliamentary systems tend to have broader spending programs 
(Persson and Tabellini 2000, ch. 10).
9 The empirical evidence strongly supports the 
prediction of greater public spending and government redistribution in parliamentary regimes 
 
9 See also Grossman and Helpman (2008), who studied the budget formation in a model of separation of powers, 
where the ruling coalition in the legislature and the executive serve different constituencies.  11 
 
 
than in presidential. However, between these two forms of government, the empirical 
differences in the composition of government spending – narrow versus broad programs – 
are, in general, weak (Persson and Tabellini 2004).  
 
Implications and testable hypotheses 
 
The literature summarized above leads us to develop three main hypotheses about the effect 
of political institutions on agricultural protection.  
The link between democratization and agricultural protection, though inconclusive from 
the theoretical point of view, can be expected to be moderately positive, as several studies 
highlight a positive effect of democratization on indicators of openness, redistribution, 
growth and agricultural protection itself. Moreover, in line with previous evidence, the 
magnitude of this effect is expected to be conditional to the form of democracy. Thus, our 
first hypothesis can be summarized as follows:  
H1. Regime change and agricultural protection: The effect of a democratic transition on 
agricultural protection is positive, and its magnitude is conditional to the specific form 
of democracy. 
The implications concerning the effect of the different forms of democracy, when 
translated to agricultural protection, need further qualification. The literature suggests two 
quite clear predictions about the level and the composition of government spending. The 
prediction about the level of spending could translate directly to agricultural policy, 
suggesting higher protection and support under parliamentary and proportional democracies 
than under presidential and majoritarian systems. Differently, the predictions about the 
composition of government spending (targeted versus broad) is more complex, and could go 
in either direction depending on the role agricultural voters play relative to other voters.  
In developed countries the farm group is small, representing a classic special interest 
group, whereas in developing countries, where the rural population often is a majority, the 
farm group represents the broad interests of the population. Thus, strictly speaking, the effect 
of regime types and electoral rules on agricultural protection should be conditional to the 
level of development, an hypothesis consistent with the recent model of Henning (2008).  
Because our objective is to test predictions concerning the potential effect of a regime change 
into different forms of democracy, a transition that largely happens in developing countries, 
the above considerations suggest that in our context agricultural protection represents a broad 12 
 
 
                                                 
redistributive programme.
10 The opposite should apply in a consolidated democracy. Keeping 
this qualification in mind, we put forward the following two hypotheses:  
H2. Forms of government and agricultural protection: Reform towards a parliamentary 
democracy, as opposed to a presidential one, will, on average, result in a greater 
increase in agricultural protection;  
H3. Electoral rules and agricultural protection: Reform towards a proportional 
democracy, as opposed to a majoritarian one, will, on average, result in a greater 
increase in agricultural protection. 
In what follow, after a description on how democratic reforms are identified and 
classified, we present our econometric strategy for formally testing the above hypotheses. 
 
 
Data and basic specification 
 
 
The sample in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) refers to 74 countries and comprises yearly 
estimates of agricultural protection from 1955 to 2007. Not every country is covered for the 
whole time period, but the average number of years of observation per country to 2005 is 35. 
Overall, we worked with an unbalanced panel with more than 2500 observations. As in Olper 
and Raimondi (2004) and other cross-country studies, the European Union countries are 
considered as separate entities, given their different levels of farm support shown in many 
studies (Bureau and Kalaitzandonakes 1995, Anderson and Valenzuela 2008).  
In classifying democratic reforms and other political institution variables, we follow 
that done in the preceding literature, particularly Persson and Tabellini (2003), Giavazzi and 
Tabellini (2005) and Persson (2005). The interested reader should refer to these papers for a 
deeper description of and justification for using those variables. Here we give only a 
summary of the key criteria and data sources.  
 
Political institution variables 
 
We classify countries into democracy or autocracy using the Polity2 index of the Polity IV 
data set. The Polity2 index assigns a value ranging from -10 to +10 to each country and year, 
 
10 Indeed, in our dataset the average and the median values of the share of agricultural population in countries 
undergoing transitions in and out of democracy is 55 percent and 57 percent, respectively.  13 
 
 
                                                 
with higher values implying more democracy. Following, Papaionannou and Siourounis 
(2008) and Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), we code a country as democratic in each year that 
the Polity2 index is strictly positive, setting a binary indicator called democracy = 1 (0 
otherwise). A reform into (or out of) democracy occurs in a country-year when this 
democracy indicator switches from 0 to 1 or vice versa. In order to render the before-after 
analysis plausible, it is also necessary that the outcome of interest, agricultural protection, be 
observed for at least two years before and after each reform episode.  
Applying these criteria to the dataset, we reach 66 transitions into or out of 
democracy, of which 41 are transitions into democracy and 25 are into autocracy. About 62 
percent of the reforms occurred before 1985. As shown in column 1 of table 1, the 
distribution of these reforms is not uniform across continents and time: 50 percent of the 
reforms are in Africa, 24 percent in Asia, 15 percent in Latin America, and 11 percent in 
high-income and Europe’s transition countries.  
Following Persson (2005), we define other binary indicators for the forms of 
democracy. Among democracies, the countries are coded as presidential (pres = 1, and parl = 
0) when the chief executive is not accountable to the legislature through a vote of confidence. 
In all other situations we have a parliamentary system (parl = 1, and pres = 0).
11 Note that, 
following this logic, we have countries with a directly elected president, such as Portugal and 
France, classified as parliamentary, and countries without a popularly elected president, such 
as Switzerland, coded as presidential. Moreover, countries are classified as majoritarian if 
their elections to the lower house rely strictly on plurality rule (maj = 1, and prop = 0). All 
the other electoral systems are classified as proportional (prop = 1, and maj = 0). The primary 
source for mapping the sample into this classification is the database of Persson and Tabellini 
(2003), supplemented by the Database on Political Institutions (DPI) of the World Bank 
(Beck et al. 2001), and the Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions (Lundell and 
Karvonen 2003).
12 
The number of transitions and their distribution across different forms of democracy is 
summarized in table 1. Row 2 shows that 83 percent of reforms are in parliamentary 
 
11 As discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2003), this represents a quite crude classification, especially because 
the conceptual model also relies on separation of powers in the legislative process. However, using also this 
dimension to classify countries as presidential or parliamentary systems introduces difficulties that are beyond 
the scope of this study.  
12 We wish to thank Krister Lundell for kindly providing the relevant variables used in this chapter. For our 
purposes, the main differences in these two data sets lie in the countries and time period covered. Specifically, 
the DPI data cover a larger set of countries but it is limited to the 1975-2004 period, while the data set of 
Lundell and Karvonen (2003) covers only ‘democracies’ but the data start in 1960, at least for more-
consolidated democracies.  14 
 
 
                                                 
democracies, whereas reforms in presidential democracies, and in proportional and 
majoritarian democracies, are more equally spread before and after 1985.  
Some problems emerge with the distribution of reforms across continents. For 
example, reforms in presidential systems are over-represented in Africa, and reforms in 
proportional systems are over-represented in Latin America (lower part of table 1). This 
suggests that the distribution of reforms is not random across continents. Thus the 
econometric estimation strategy needs to avoid confounding this continent-specific incidence 
of reforms from continent-specific trends in agricultural protection (Persson 2005).
13  
 
Dependent variable and structural controls 
 
We test our hypotheses using two different dependent variables: the agricultural nominal rate 
of assistance (NRA) and the relative rate of assistance (RRA), both from the World Bank’s 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives Database (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008, 
methodological details for which are in Anderson et al. 2008). The NRA is measured as the 
weighted average of the nominal rate of assistance at the product level, using as a weight the 
industry’s value share of each product. Differently the RRA to agriculture is calculated as the 
ratio between the agricultural and non-agricultural NRA.
14 One advantage of using also the 
RRA is that, especially in developing countries, one important source of indirect taxation to 
agriculture comes from protection of manufacturing sectors. Thus, the RRA is a more useful 
indicator in undertaking international comparison over time of the extent to which a country’s 
policy regime has an anti- or pro-agricultural bias (see Anderson et al. 2008).  
To simplify the interpretation of the regression coefficients, we express NRA (and 
RRA) as a percentage. Thus, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on our political 
institution indicators measures the average percentage point changes in agricultural protection 
implied by a transition into (or out of) democracy. 
In the empirical specification we include additional structural controls that are likely 
to affect the level of agricultural protection, as suggested by many previous studies (e.g. 
Anderson 1995, Beghin and Kherallah 2004, Swinnen et al. 2000, Olper 2001). Specifically, 
our basic specification always includes the following structural controls: the level of 
 
13 All the reform episodes discussed above, and their specific classifications, are listed in part (a) of the Annex 
to this chapter, while part (b) of that Annex reports the few (eleven) constitutional reforms that happen in 
permanent democracies. 
14 Specifically, RRA is calculated as [(1 + NRAag)/(1 + NRAnonag)-1], where NRAag is the nominal rate of 
assistance to agricultural tradables and NRAnonag is the average  nominal rate of assistance to non-agricultural 
tradable sectors. 15 
 
 
development, measured by the log of real per capita GDP; agricultural employment as a share 
of total employment; the log of agricultural land per capita; the log of total population; and, 
finally, given the high persistency of agricultural protection and for reasons discussed below, 
we always include the lagged dependent variable. All these variables are computed using 
FAO and World Bank (WDI) sources, or otherwise national statistics.  
 
 A preliminary look at the data 
 
Table 2 displays average levels of the nominal rate of assistance in the full sample, and splits 
the sample across different forms of democracy and over time. Several interesting patterns 
emerge. First, autocratic countries have, on average, as well as in each time period 
considered, a negative NRA: agriculture in these countries is taxed at an average rate of −15 
percent. The opposite applies in democratic countries, whose farmers are strongly protected 
at an average rate of 45 percent (although at a decreasing rate starting from the mid-1980s).  
Another clear pattern emerges on comparing protection across electoral rules. 
Majoritarian countries consistently have a lower NRA than proportional ones. While the gap 
apparently decreases over time, in 2000-05 the relative differences are still stark and close to 
that of the 1960-64 period. The last two columns of Table 2 contrast presidential and 
parliamentary democracies. Here the pattern appears less clear: until 1975 presidential 
democracies had an average NRA very close to parliamentary democracies, then we see a 
shift with consistently higher NRAs in parliamentary democracies. 
Figure 1 displays a more formal test for unconditional differences in average NRAs 
across constitutional features. This is based on a smoothed non-parametric regression line 
with its correspondent 95 percent confidence interval. As evident from the figure, for both 
autocracies and democracies, and across electoral rules, the differences are stark. Consistent 
with the basic data reported in Table 2, for parliamentary and presidential systems the 95 
percent confidence interval of the two line overlaps for about half of the period, suggesting 
that the difference in the average NRA across forms of government is small.  
Generally speaking, these patterns appear not in contradiction with the predictions 
discussed before. However it is too early to come to any conclusions about the effect of 
constitutional rules on agricultural protection. This is because our key constitutional 
dimension, democracy, is also correlated to the level of development, which is itself a 
fundamental determinant of agricultural protection. Also, as shown above and as explained in 16 
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Persson and Tabellini (2003), the forms of democracy are not random but are correlated with 
other characteristics such as history and the continental location of a country. Thus before 
any inferences are drawn concerning the effect of constitutions on policy outcomes, we need 




Econometric approach and results 
 
 
Following recent tendencies in the comparative political economy literature (e.g., Rodrik and 
Wacziarg 2004, Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005, Persson 2005) we estimate the average effect of 
constitutions on policy outcomes using the difference-in-differences approach. This means 
running panel regressions with the following specification: 
                              (1)  t i t i t i t i x D , , , ε θ α ρ + + + +
where yi,t  denotes our measure of interest, namely agricultural protection, αi and θt are 
respectively the country and year fixed effects, xi,t is a set of control variables, and Di,t is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 under democracy and 0 otherwise. The parameter β is the 
difference-in-differences estimate of the reform effect. It is obtained by comparing average 
protection after a democratic transition, minus protection before the transition in the treated 
countries, to the change in protection in the control countries over the same period (Persson 
and Tabellini 2008). Here the control countries are those that do not experience a transition 
into or out of democracy, thus those that have either Di,t = 1 or Di,t = 0 over the entire sample 
period.  
We use regression (1) to estimate the average effect of democratization on agricultural 
protection. Moreover, as we are particularly interested in the (potential) heterogeneous effects 
induced by different forms of democracy, we follow Persson (2005) using also a multiple 
treatments specification: 
                           (2) 
where the D
f
i,t is now a binary variable for a sub-set of the different forms of democracy f = 
1,...., F, namely majoritarian versus proportional democracy or parliamentary versus 
presidential democracy. Once again we compare the change in protection before and after the 17 
 
 
specific democratic transition with the change in protection of those countries that do not 
experience a reform over the sample period. 
As stressed by Persson (2005), one problem with the interpretation of these 
specifications is the correct econometric identification. Specifically, the coefficient β
f 
identifies the causal effect of different democratic reforms only if countries in the various 
reform groups do not have trends in y which are different from those in the control group but 
unrelated to reforms. As discussed before, the frequency of transitions into democracy 
(autocracy) and different forms of democracy change quite a lot across continents. Thus, to 
avoid confounding such non-random incidence with continents-specific trends in agricultural 
protection, we ensure that the estimates of β
f are robust to the inclusion of a set of continent-
time interaction effects. 
A final econometric problem arises when the dependent variable displays a strong 
positive autocorrelation. In that circumstance, Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) show 
that the estimated standard errors with the difference-in-differences approach are strongly 
underestimated. To overcome this, we follow the most conservative method of estimating 
standard errors by clustering at the country level, allowing arbitrary country-specific serial 
correlation. Moreover, we always add to the specifications the lagged dependent variable. 
This transforms specifications (1) and (2) into a dynamic panel model where the lagged 
dependent variable allows for the strong persistence of agricultural protection.  
 
Democracy and protection: econometric results 
 
Table 3 displays the results of specification (1) estimated across different samples. This 
corresponds to a standard difference-in-differences estimation on yearly data. The 
specification, other than country and year fixed effects and the controls reported in table 3, 
always includes the log of country population, the agricultural employment share, the land 
per capita and the interaction effects between continent and year dummies. We start by 
making a couple of comments on the sign and significant level of the standard controls.  
First, and not surprisingly, agricultural protection is positively and significantly associated 
with the level of development (GDP per capita), and displays strong persistency. In other 
words, current protection is a very good predictor of future protection. Moreover, protection 
is positively related to the log of population, and negatively to both land per capita and 
employment share (results not shown). However, it is important to note that the last variables 18 
 
 
                                                 
are insignificant in several specifications, suggesting that in the previous analyses they 
especially capture the cross-country variation in protection, here subsumed in the fixed 
effects.  
Turning to the key variable of interest, democracy, and following Persson and 
Tabellini (2008), the regressions of Table 3 explore different assumptions about the 
treatments and the control group, testing the effect of a democratic transition on different 
samples.  
Regression (1) imposes the assumption that the effect on protection of a transition to 
democracy is the same as the negativity of the effect of a transition to autocracy, thus 
exploiting the full sample. The coefficient on democracy is positive and significant at the 1 
percent level, meaning that a transition into democracy induces an increase in agricultural 
protection of about 4 percent points. Thus the effect is not only statistically significant, but 
also important from an economic point of view.  
Regression (2) estimates only the effect of a transition into democracy, removing 
reforms to autocracy from the sample, and using as a control group only permanent 
autocracy. The democracy coefficient is again positive, but drops somewhat in magnitude and 
it is only barely significant. However, a shortcoming of this regression is that we have only 
11 countries that remain permanent autocracies across the sample period, and two of these − 
Chad and Togo − are somewhat problematic.
15 In regression (3), by adding also permanent 
democracies to the control group, the coefficient on the democracy dummy increases and 
turns out to be significant at the 1 percent level. Now the estimate implies that a democratic 
transition induces a greater NRA, by 4.4 percentage points.  
Regression (4) estimates the effect of a transition out of democracy (or into 
autocracy), using permanent democracies as the control group. Here the democracy 
coefficient is still positive, suggesting that the effect goes in the expected direction,
16 but it is 
low in magnitude and statistically not significant. Finally, in regression (5) we allow the 
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable to take on a different value across constitutional 
groups, by interacting the democracy dummy with the lagged NRA. The interaction 
coefficient is positive and significant, showing that democracies display more persistence in 
agricultural policy than autocracies. 
 
15 A potential problem with these countries, as well as with Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali, is that we only have 
protection data for one product, cotton. Thus, any specific shock on this sector could substantially affect the 
protection level of our benchmark in that regression. Note however that all these countries are not considered in 
the RRA sample. 
16 Remember that we are measuring the negative protection effect of a transition away from democracy. 19 
 
 
                                                 
Columns (6) to (10), replicate the same battery of regressions using RRA as the 
dependent variable. As can be seen, the results are very similar: only a slightly lower 
democracy effect is detected. Once again, the democracy coefficient is always positive, and 
significantly different from zero when the treatment measures transitions toward democracy, 
and the control group also includes the permanent democracies, just as it is positive but 
insignificant when the treatment measures transition out of democracy, or the control group 
includes only permanent autocracies.
17  
Summarizing, this preliminary evidence suggests that the effect of transition to 
democracy induces an increase in agricultural protection of about 3-4 percentage points. 
Thus, agriculture, which is discriminated against and taxed in an autocratic country, will take 
advantage of a redistribution process after a democratic transition. This result is in line with 
the evidence reported in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Swinnen, Banerjee and de 
Gorter (2001). Moreover, the fact that the same relation does not hold for transition out of 
democracy appears consistent with several stylized facts suggesting that, once implemented, 
agricultural policies tend to persist for some time, even if changes in (external) factors make 
them ‘inefficient’ or not politically justifiable (Olper and Swinnen 2008) 
 
Forms of democracy and protection: econometric results 
 
Table 4 tests Hypotheses 2 and 3, namely that forms of democracy should matter. This is 
done by interacting our democracy dummy with the respective dummies for government 
types and electoral rules, in order to disentangle their (potential) differentiated effect. 
Regression (1) of table 4 contrasts parliamentary and presidential regimes. Contrary to our 
expectation, a reform to presidential democracy induces growth in agricultural protection that 
is slightly higher than a reform to proportional democracy, from 4.2 to 3.7 percent points, 
respectively. However, the two coefficients are not significantly different from each other. 
Thus this preliminary evidence does not support the idea that reform into parliamentary 
democracy induces a higher NRA than reform to a presidential democracy.  
Regression (3) of table 4 contrasts the effect of reform to proportional democracy with 
reform to majoritarian democracy. Now the estimated differences are stark and in line with 
the prediction. The average protection effect of a transition towards a proportional democracy 
is 6.8 percentage points, thus about three time higher than a shift toward a majoritarian 
 
17 Note that by using RRA, we lose 5 countries from the full sample, as well as several observations as the RRA 
coverage is lower than NRA.  20 
 
 
democracy, where the estimated coefficient is also barely significant. Not surprisingly, the F-
statistic for the equality of electoral coefficients is strongly significant (results not shown), 
implying that what matters for democratic reform appears to be the choice of electoral rule. 
Next, in regressions (2) and (4) of table 4, we allow the coefficient for the lagged 
dependent variable to take on a different value across different constitutional features. 
Parliamentary and presidential democracies do not display differences in persistence. At the 
level of electoral rules, the differences are important, with proportional democracies showing 
higher persistence in agricultural protection than majoritarian democracies. Finally, 
regression (5) considers the distinction between permanent and temporary reforms. Not 
surprisingly, permanent democratization strongly increases the probability of a higher NRA, 
whereas temporary reforms have a lower and only slightly significant effect.  
Table 5 replicates the same regressions using the RRA as the dependent variable. As 
we can see, all the qualitative and quantitative results discussed above remain substantially 
unchanged, suggesting that they are quite robust to small change in the sample size and 
country coverage, and in the definition of the dependent variable.  
Finally, table 6 considers a more defined characterization of the forms of democracy, 
splitting the constitutional variables into the following four categories: parl-prop, pres-prop, 
parl-maj, and pres-maj. If the parliamentary-presidential distinction is independent of the 
proportional-majoritarian distinction, then the effects of the form of government and the 
electoral rule should be additive (Persson 2005). The evidence supports this hypothesis 
weakly, and only for reforms into parliamentary-proportional democracy, where the 
respective estimated coefficients for NRA regressions, with values ranging from 8.4 to 9.6, 
are not far from the sum of the respective individual coefficients reported in table 4. That is, 
there is some evidence that the effect of proportional election is dampened under presidential 
systems.  
Summing up, in line with theoretical predictions we find heterogeneity in the 
protection effect induced by different constitutional rules. Transition toward a parliamentary-
proportional democracy increases a country’s agricultural NRA by about 8 percentage points, 
and by about 5 percentage points for a presidential-proportional democracy. Instead the 
protectionism bias of a transition toward a parliamentary- or a presidential-majoritarian 
democracy is virtually zero. This evidence suggests that agricultural protection is affected 
more by constitutional differences in electoral rules than by differences in the form of 
government. This evidence is in line with the predictions summarized in the theory section 
above, and are qualitatively similar to results obtained at a more aggregate level by  Persson 21 
 
 
(2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2006), with the important qualification that at the 







Motivated by recent developments in political economy theory about the effect of rule-based 
political institutions on public policy outcomes, we have investigated how transitions into 
democracy affect agricultural protection. The empirical results highlight the important role 
played by the form of democracy in affecting agricultural policy distortions. In particular, 
using panel data and difference-in-differences estimation, we first documented a significant 
positive effect of a democratic transition on agricultural protection. We then showed that this 
average effect masks important heterogeneities across different forms of democracy. Indeed, 
what matters are transitions to proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) democracies, as well 
as to permanent (as opposed to temporary) democracies. Moreover, while we do not detect 
significant differences across alternative forms of government, there is evidence that the 
effect of proportional systems is exacerbated under parliamentary regimes, but dampened 
under presidential ones. Finally, we find indications that different constitutional rules affect 
the dynamic adjustment of agricultural protection. Overall, these results support the notion 
that rules-based institutions do matter in affecting the adoption of structural policies.  
Several further improvements should be made to better understand the interaction 
between institutions and agricultural policy distortions. For example, this analysis has 
assumed that electoral rules directly affect political incentives. However, there is evidence 
that electoral rules shape public policy only indirectly, through their effect on party and 
government structure (Persson, Roland and Tabellini 2008). At the same time, the partial 
evidence detected concerning the differentiated effect exerted by different forms of 
government could simply suggest that other regime features, such as a separation of powers, 
should matter. Extensions into these and other directions could improve our understanding of 
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Annex: National policy reform episodes, 1955 to 2005 
 
(a) Exits and entries in different forms of democracy 
 






Argentina 1973  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Argentina 1976  Out  Presidential  Proportional 
Argentina 1983  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Benin 1991  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Burkinafaso 1977  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Burkinafaso 1980  Out  Presidential  Proportional 
Bangladesh 1991  Into  Parlamentary  Majoritarian 
Brazil 1985  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Chile 1973  Out  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Chile 1989  Into  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Cote d'Ivoire  2000  Into  Presidential Majoritarian 
Cote d'Ivoire  2002  Out  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Dominican Rep.  1978  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Ecuador 1968  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Ecuador 1970  Out  Presidential  Proportional 
Ecuador 1979  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Spain 1976  Into  Parlamentary  Proportional 
Ethiopia 1994  Into  Parlamentary  Majoritarian 
Ghana 1970  Into  Parlamentary  Majoritarian 
Ghana 1972  Out  Parlamentary  Majoritarian 
Ghana 1979  Into  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Ghana 1981  Out  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Ghana 1996  Into  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Indonesia 1999  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Kenya 1966  Out  Parlamentary  Majoritarian 
Kenya 2002  Into  Presidential Majoritarian 
Korea 1963  Into  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Korea 1972  Out  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Korea 1987  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Madagascar 1991  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Mexico 1994  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Mali 1992  Into  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Mozambique 1994  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Nigeria 1966  Out  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Nigeria 1979  Into  Presidential Majoritarian 
Nigeria 1984  Out  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Nigeria 1999  Into  Presidential Majoritarian 
Pakistan 1970  Out  Presidential Majoritarian 
Pakistan 1972  Into  Presidential Majoritarian 
Pakistan 1977  Out  Presidential Majoritarian 
Pakistan 1988  Into  Presidential Majoritarian 
Pakistan 1999  Out  Presidential Majoritarian 
Philippines 1972  Out  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Philippines 1986  Into  Presidential  Majoritarian 28 
 
 
Portugal 1975  Into  Parlamentary  Proportional 
Sudan
a  1958 Out     
Sudan 1965  Into  Parlamentary  Majoritarian 
Sudan 1970  Out  Parlamentary  Majoritarian 
Sudan 1986  Into  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Sudan 1989  Out  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Senegal 2000  Into  Presidential  Proportional 
Thailand 1974  Into  Parlamentary Majoritarian 
Thailand 1976  Out  Parlamentary  Majoritarian 
Thailand 1978  Into  Parlamentary Majoritarian 
Turkey 1971  Out  Parlamentary  Proportional 
Turkey 1973  Into  Parlamentary  Proportional 
Turkey 1980  Out  Parlamentary  Proportional 
Turkey 1983  Into  Parlamentary  Proportional 
Taiwan 1992  Into  Parlamentary  Proportional 
Tanzania 2000  Into  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Uganda 1966  Out  Parlamentary  Majoritarian 
Uganda 1980  Into  Presidential Majoritarian 
Uganda 1985  Out  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Zambia 1968  Out  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Zambia 1991  Into  Presidential  Majoritarian 




(b) Reforms in existing democracies 
 
Country Reform    Type of reform 
Bangladesh 1991    Government:  presidential to parliamentary 
France  1986    Election: majoritarian to proportional 
France  1988    Election: proportional to majoritarian 
New Zealand  1996    Election: majoritarian to proportional 
Philippines  1998    Election: majoritarian to proportional 
Philippines  2001    Election: proportional to majoritarian 
South Africa  1994    Election: majoritarian to proportional 
Sri Lanka  1979    Government: parliamentary to presidential 
Sri Lanka  1989    Election: majoritarian to proportional 
Taiwan 1996    Government:  parliamentary to presidential 
Ukraine  1998    Election: majoritarian to proportional 
 
a Sudan’s reform in 1958 is unclassifiable. 
 
Source: See text. 29 
 
 
Figure 1: Average nominal rate of assistance to the agricultural sector over constitutional 
features,




























































Source: see text. 
 
a The figures show the evolution of the (smoothed) average NRAs, and their 95 percent 
confidence interval (computed using Stata’s lpolyci using bandwith 3 and degree 4), 
calculated across democratic and autocratic regimes and across different forms of 
government. A country in a given year is classified as a democracy if variable Polity2 in the 
Polity IV data set is greater than zero (see text). 30 
 
 
 Table 1: Number of policy reforms and their distribution under different forms of 
democracy,




  All Into Out  PARL  PRES  PROP  MAJ 
          
Number of 
transitions  66  41 25 18 47 24 41 
          
Share (%) of all 
transitions  pre-1985  62  49 84 83 53 67 59 
          
Regional shares (%) 
of  all  transitions:          
          
      Latin  America 15  17  12 0 21  33 5 
          
      Africa  50  46 56 39 53 25 63 
          
      Asia  24  24 24 28 23 13 32 
          
   Other countries  11  13  12  33  3  29  0 
          
      TOTAL  100  100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: see text. 
 
a Number of democratic transitions classified by forms of democracy and their relative 
distribution across time and continents (see text). The sum across different forms of 
government does not give the total number of transitions because one transition (Sudan in 




Table 2: Average nominal rates of assistance to the agricultural sector over political regimes,
a 




Autocracy Democracy MAJ  PROP  PRES  PARL 
1956-59  0.41  -0.13  0.66  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1960-64  0.28  -0.16  0.54  0.13 0.98 0.73 0.49 
1965-69  0.27  -0.13  0.51  0.10 1.02 0.53 0.51 
1970-74  0.10  -0.24  0.46  0.04 0.90 0.48 0.45 
1975-79  0.10  -0.23  0.44  0.04 0.75 0.37 0.48 
1980-84  0.09  -0.22  0.38  0.12 0.60 0.12 0.51 
1985-89  0.29  -0.06  0.59  0.16 0.85 0.30 0.75 
1990-94  0.23  -0.14  0.41  0.09 0.59 0.24 0.53 
1995-99  0.19  -0.13  0.28  0.03 0.38 0.21 0.33 
2000-05  0.20  -0.08  0.26  0.04 0.35 0.20 0.31 
            



















Source: Authors’ estimations 
 
a The figures report simple average of NRA across constitutional features and sub-periods. 
The number of countries refers to ‘total presences’ in each category in 1956-2005 (1960-2005 
for forms of government), and changes over time due to entry and exit. 32 
 
 
Table 3: Democracy and nominal rates of assistance to the agricultural sector,
a difference-in-differences estimates 
 
Regression number: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Dependent variable    NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA RRA RRA RRA RRA RRA 
          
Democracy  4.10*** 3.20*  4.41*** 2.31 5.38***  3.47*** 2.73 3.70*** 1.39 4.91*** 
(1.24) (1.86) (1.44) (1.62) (1.48) (1.20) (1.67) (1.38) (1.87) (1.48) 
          
Lagged NRA (RRA)  0.77*** 0.67*** 0.78*** 0.79*** 0.68*** 0.77*** 0.70*** 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.73*** 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
          
Dem*lagged NRA    0.11***  0.06** 
(RRA)    (0.04)  (0.03) 
     
Log GDP per capita   14.45*** 15.12*** 15.66*** 16.79** 15.16*** 11.71*** 10.99** 12.79*** 18.42*** 12.32***
(3.45) (5.08) (4.16) (7.14) (3.67) (3.19) (5.16) (3.92) (6.76) (3.49) 
          
Treatment 
(transition to) 
  Democracy 
autocracy 




Democracy Democracy Autocracy Democracy   
autocracy 
          
Control group 
(permanent) 












          
Continent-year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2568 1191 2291 1517 2568 2314 1002 2064 1449 2314 
Number  of  countries   74 38 73 52 74 69 33 68 51 69 
R
2  (within)    0.73 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.74 
 




a Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All regressions include: log of population, agricultural employment share, land per 
capita, year and country fixed effects, and interaction effects between continents (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) and year dummies (see text).  
 
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10.          34 
 
 




Regression  number:    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable    NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
        
PARL   3.69** 4.98***       
   (1.85)  (1.85)      
PRES   4.22*** 5.66***      
   (1.39)  (1.83)      
PROP       6.76*** 6.77***   
       (1.61)  (1.71)   
MAJ       2.38* 2.69   
       (1.42)  (1.80)   
Permanent           5.53*** 
           (1.40) 
Temporary           2.96* 
           (1.65) 
Lagged NRA    0.77*** 0.68*** 0.77*** 0.66*** 0.77*** 
    (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
PARL * Lagged NRA     0.11**      
     (0.05)     
PRES * Lagged NRA     0.12***      
     (0.04)     
PROP * Lagged NRA        0.14***  
      (0.04)  
MAJ * Lagged NRA        -0.04  
      (0.06)  
            
Observations    2511 2511 2511 2511 2568 
Number of countries    74  74  74  74  74 
Within R
2   0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.73 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations 
 
a Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All regressions include: log 
GDP per capita, log of population, agricultural employment share, agricultural land per 
capita, years and country fixed effects, and interaction effects between continents (Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America) and years dummies (see text). 
 
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10.    35 
 
 




Regression  number:    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable    RRA RRA RRA RRA RRA 
        
PARL   3.10* 5.13**       
   (1.92)  (2.17)      
PRES   3.64*** 5.10***      
   (1.36)  (1.74)      
PROP       5.52*** 6.40***   
       (1.68)  (2.08)   
MAJ       2.27 1.61   
       (1.49)  (2.08)   
Permanent             4.96*** 
           (1.39) 
Temporary             2.49 
           (1.69) 
Lagged RRA    0.77*** 0.71*** 0.77*** 0.69*** 0.77*** 
    (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
PARL * Lagged RRA     0.08*      
     (0.05)     
PRES * Lagged RRA     0.06**      
     (0.03)     
PROP * Lagged RRA        0.12**  
      (0.05)  
MAJ * Lagged RRA        -0.05  
      (0.05)  
            
Observations    2273 2273 2273 2273 2314 
Number of countries    69  69  69  69  69 
Within R
2   0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations 
 
a Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All regressions include: log 
GDP per capita, log of population, agricultural employment share, agricultural land per 
capita, years and country fixed effects, and interaction effects between continents (Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America) and years dummies (see text). 
 








Regression number:   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable    NRA NRA RRA RRA 
       
PARL_PROP   9.64*** 8.43*** 7.50***  5.68** 
  (2.48) (2.20) (2.51) (2.74) 
      
PRES_PROP   6.01*** 5.39*** 5.19***  4.66** 
  (1.92) (1.68) (1.83) (1.83) 
      
PARL_MAJ   0.38 0.83 1.83 1.50 
  (1.86) (1.71) (2.09) (1.92) 
      
PRES_MAJ   2.76 2.33 1.98 1.98 
  (1.61) (1.56) (1.66) (1.68) 
      
Lagged NRA    0.76*** 0.77*** 0.76*** 0.77*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Log GDP per capita    13.45*** 14.90*** 11.29*** 11.42*** 
    (3.43) (3.77) (3.11) (3.39) 
       
Continent-year dummies    No Yes No Yes 
Observations    2505 2505 2273 2273 
Number of countries    74 74 69 69 
Within R
2    0.69 0.73 0.70 0.74 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations 
 
a Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All regressions include: log of 
population, employment share, land per capita, year and country fixed effects. Interaction 
between years and continent dummies (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) included as 
indicated (see text). 
  
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10.  